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[E]very Member of this Court has written or joined at least one opin-
ion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and irrevoca-
bility, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other
punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to
ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense. 1
Although the Supreme Court has added four new Justices since this
case was decided, 2 a majority of the Court reaffirmed this fundamental
principle on the last day of its most recently completed Term.3 Despite
this, the Supreme Court made no distinction between capital and non-
capital punishment as it developed a radical new doctrine for the consid-
eration of habeas corpus petitions:4 If the petitioner seeks to benefit from
a Supreme Court decision that reinterprets the constitutional safeguards
required for a fair trial (i.e., seeks to use a "new rule")5 and that was
decided after the petitioner's case was finalized, his case will not be heard
1. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
2. Justice Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986, Justice Kennedy in 1988, Jus-
tice Souter in 1990, and Justice Thomas in 1991.
3. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991). The five Justices constituting the
majority for this section of the opinion included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter-often considered the "conservatives" of the Court.
4. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989). A leading treatise on federal jurisdic-
tion explains the nature of habeas corpus (the "Great Writ"):
A litigant in a state court generally may secure federal court review of the state court's
judgments and proceedings only by first exhausting all available appeals within the state
system and then seeking review of the final judgment in the United States Supreme Court.
Federal district courts lack the authority to hear appeals from state judicial systems. How-
ever, federal courts have the authority to review state court criminal convictions pursuant
to writs of habeas corpus. Under federal law, a person who claims to be held in custody by
a state government in violation of the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States
may file a civil lawsuit in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Technically, fed-
eral court consideration of the habeas corpus petition is not considered a direct review of
the state court decision; rather, the petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal
court and is termed collateral relief. Pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus the federal court
may order the release of a state prisoner who is held by the state in violation of federal law.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 677-78 (1989) (footnote omitted).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29 for an explanation of the "new rule" definition.
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on the merits unless he falls within one of two exceptions.6 Even though
the doctrine was initially developed in a non-capital case,7 the Court nev-
ertheless applied it to a capital case in which it was implicated without
any alteration or discussion.8 Three cases in the Court's subsequent
Term further refined the doctrine,9 thereby establishing the applicable
law for federal habeas corpus challenges to state-imposed death
sentences. Although one may argue that the newly developed doctrine is
unwise and unfair in all contexts, its application to capital sentencing is
particularly egregious in light of the unique nature of the death penalty. 10
This Note argues that the Supreme Court, when applying its new doc-
trine to capital cases, moved too hastily and failed to consider the quali-
tative distinction between capital and non-capital punishment. The
Court should therefore amend its new doctrine in the capital sentencing
context.
In its 1989 Term, the Supreme Court affirmed three death sentences
that suffered from constitutional flaws that would have normally consti-
tuted reversible error. 1  Unfortunately for the criminal defendants in-
volved, the Court did not consider their claims on the merits because of
the procedural posture of their cases. All three challenged their
sentences through federal habeas corpus proceedings, an avenue that had
been used effectively by other death-row inmates on numerous previous
occasions. 12 These petitioners, however, were unable to have their claims
heard because they were the victims of a new Supreme Court doctrine
relating to habeas corpus proceedings: A federal court will refuse to con-
sider the defendant's claim on the merits unless certain stringent criteria
pertaining to retroactivity are met. This new doctrine promises to im-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39 for an explanation of these exceptions.
7. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
8. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 313-14.
9. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Sawyer
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
10. This Note focuses on federal habeas corpus review of state-imposed death sentences, not on
review of the substantive guilt or innocence of the defendant. Under most state procedures, offenses
that carry the possibility of a death sentence are tried in two phases (bifurcated). First, the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence is determined. Then, having been found guilty, a second proceeding (usually
before the same jury, sometimes before the judge alone, depending on the state) determines whether
the defendant shall be sentenced to death. See, eg., CAL.'PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1991); see
also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 456 n.8 (1982) (citing states with this system). This Note
concentrates on appeals from death sentences imposed in the second phase of capital trials.
11. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Safle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990); Sawyer
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
12. See, eg., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66
(1987).
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pact adversely the ability of death-row inmates to attack collaterally their
convictions and sentences through federal habeas corpus.
The Rehnquist Court in Teague v. Lane 13 heralded a new approach
toward federal habeas corpus, one that will likely become more firmly
entrenched with the replacement of Justice Brennan with Justice Sou-
ter, 14 and the replacement of Justice Marshall with Justice Thomas. The
Teague doctrine involves retroactive application of Supreme Court deci-
sional law to cases presented on collateral review (i.e., habeas corpus).
The basic question of Teague is simple to articulate: Should prisoners
who are properly convicted under a previous regime of constitutional in-
terpretation be permitted, on collateral review, to benefit from a
favorable change in that interpretation? The answer goes to the center of
the debate over the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and the desire
for a definitive end to individual prosecutions. If one believes, as do the
dissenters in the cases that follow, that the purpose of habeas corpus is to
correct constitutionally flawed convictions or sentences, the answer is a
resounding "yes"-if at any time a person has been convicted under
what is later determined to have been unconstitutional circumstances,
habeas relief should be available to that person. If, however, one agrees
with the current Court majority that the primary role of habeas review is
to police the states and prevent unconstitutional practices by those states,
the answer is "no" -retroactive application of decisional law on habeas
review cannot possibly affect state conduct because at the time of the
conviction, the states were operating within the dictates of the Constitu-
tion as it was then interpreted. This debate lies at the heart of Teague.15
The result of Teague and its progeny is the creation of a general rule
against retroactive application of new decisional law to cases presented
on collateral review, subject to two limited exceptions. As one might
expect, the scope and breadth of these exceptions provide the current
battleground.
13. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
14. Although one can never predict with certainty the way a particular Justice will decide a
particular issue, Justice Souter's position can be anticipated with some confidence. The Court's new
retroactivity doctrine is based upon two of the second Justice Harlan's opinions, see infra text ac-
companying notes 29-43, and one of the few definitive positions that Justice Souter was willing to
take during his Senate confirmation hearings was that he was a devotee of Justice Harlan's judicial
philosophy. See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 56
(1990). Thus, it is likely that Justice Souter will embrace the reasoning of his judicial hero in this
area. However, the Teague doctrine as adopted by the Court was not wholly faithful to Justice
Harlan's opinions; Justice O'Connor significantly modified and limited certain aspects of Justice
Harlan's approach. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. Justice Souter might therefore agree with Justice
Stevens, who would have remained faithful to Justice Harlan's original construction. See id. at 318-
19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
15. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-10; id. at 327-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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This Note examines the Teague retroactivity doctrine as it applies to
capital cases and suggests a modified approach that would both satisfy
the ends sought by the doctrine's supporters on the Court and provide
for more meaningful collateral review of death sentences. The argument
proceeds from the premise, well-supported by numerous opinions written
or joined in by nearly every current Justice, that the death penalty is
qualitatively different from any other form of punishment, and that it
deserves such treatment in this arena as well. Toward that end, however,
the Court need not totally abandon the Teague doctrine, but needs sim-
ply to allow for a more flexible application in the capital sentencing con-
text. Further, many of the ends sought to be established by judicial
limitation on habeas review of death sentences have already been met in
other contexts, and should not motivate decisions made in this area.
Part I of this Note details the birth of the new doctrine in Teague v.
Lane, and Part II discusses its subsequent application to capital sentenc-
ing cases in Penry v. Lynaugh. Part III details the three major decisions
of the following Term, which define and limit the Teague doctrine. Part
IV sets forth the argument for disparate treatment of capital cases. Fi-
nally, Part V presents a modification of the current retroactivity doctrine
for capital cases.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
Teague v. Lane 16 has been heralded as "one of the Supreme Court's
most important habeas corpus decisions in decades."' 17 In Teague, Frank
Teague collaterally attacked his state conviction for attempted murder
on the grounds, inter alia, that the prosecuting attorney intentionally ex-
cluded blacks from his petit jury, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment
rights.18 Before considering the merits of Teague's claim, however, a
16. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 15.5.4, at 129 (Supp. 1990). Because the focus of this Note
is on later application of the Teague doctrine in capital cases, the discussion of Teague is somewhat
abbreviated in favor of those subsequent cases. However, Teague did generate a substantial amount
of literature, and the interested reader may look to some of the following articles for a more substan-
tial analysis and criticism of the case. See, eg., Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ:
How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183; Joseph L. Hoffman,
The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV.
165 [hereinafter Hoffman, New Vision]; Ellen E. BoshkofF, Note, Resolving Retroactivity after Teague
v. Lane, 65 IND. L.J. 651 (1990); Roger D. Branigin III, Comment, Sixth Amendment-The Evolu-
tion of the Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 1128 (1990); Eliot F. Krieger, Comment, The Court Declines in Fairness, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 164 (1990); Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Habeas Corpus Collateral
Attack on State Criminal Convictions, 103 HARV. L. REV. 290 (1989).
18. Teague, 489 U.S. at 293. One of the more academically annoying aspects of the decision
was that it squarely presented, and yet declined to address, a question that the Court had managed to
avoid since Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and that held great interest to the criminal law
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plurality of the Supreme Court, led by Justice O'Connor, decided that
the case presented an excellent opportunity to rethink and to reformulate
the current approach to retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings. 19
Thus, the plurality proceeded to discard the prior approach to retroactiv-
ity20 in favor of a new formulation.
As an initial matter, the plurality acknowledged that the retroactiv-
ity issue had been neither raised nor briefed by either party in the case;
indeed, the only suggestion that the Court rethink its position came from
an amicus brief filed by the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. 21 Yet
the Court seemed unconcerned by the lack of discussion, stating that
"our sua sponte consideration of retroactivity is far from novel."' 22 The
plurality then expressly adopted the relatively uncontroversial position
that "the question '[of] whether a decision announcing a new rule should
be given prospective or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of
that decision.' "23 However, the Court went on to assert that
"[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a
new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule,
even-handed justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are
similarly situated."' 24 This statement was rejected by four Justices of the
bar-whether a defendant is entitled to a fair cross-section of the population on the petit jury. By
crafting its new retroactivity rules, the Court managed to avoid the issue on procedural grounds. In
the next Term, the Court did decide against such a cross section requirement for petit juries. See
Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
19. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
20. Until Teague, retroactivity determinations were guided by Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965). In that case, the Court was faced with the question of whether the exclusionary rule of
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was to be applied retroactively. The Court determined that
retroactivity questions should be answered by examining the purposes of the rule in question, the
reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of such a rule. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. Under that standard, the Mapp rule was
held to apply only to trials that commenced after that case was decided. Id. at 640.
In practice, the rules laid out in Linkletter proved difficult to apply:
The Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results. Instead, it has been
used to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct review, other new rules only
to the defendants in the cases announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in
which trials have not yet commenced. Not surprisingly, commentators have "had a verita-
ble field day" with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being "more than
mildly negative."
Teague, 489 U.S. at 302-03 (quoting Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years ofNon-Retroactivity: A Critique
and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1558 (1975)).
21. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Respon-
dent at 4-5, Teague (No. 87-5259).
22. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court,
The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 64 (1965)).
24. Id.
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Court,25 and only grudgingly adopted by a fifth.26 Under the plurality's
new approach, therefore, if the habeas petitioner advocates the adoption
of a new rule, the court must make an initial determination as to the
retroactive effects of such a rule before considering the argument on the
merits.
The Teague court recognized the problems inherent in such a deter-
mination, noting that "[i]t is admittedly often difficult to determine when
a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spec-
trum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity pur-
poses." 27 However, the plurality went on to do exactly that:
in general, however, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Gov-
ernment. To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's con-
viction became final. 28
Thus, the plurality adopted two different definitions of what constitutes a
"new rule," apparently assuming the two to be functionally equivalent.
Having dispensed with the definition of a "new rule," the plurality then
adopted Justice Harlan's premise that "new rules generally should not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review." 29
The underlying explanation for Justice Harlan's (and the plurality's)
adoption of this doctrine lies in his view of the fundamental purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus. Justice Harlan strongly argued that the pri-
mary function of the writ was to deter state court misconduct, 30 and that
25. See id. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment) (joined by Justice Black-
mun); id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Marshall).
26. See id. at 317 (White, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
27. Id. at 301.
28. Id. (citations omitted). The extraordinary breadth of this definition and its ability to sweep
nearly every Supreme Court decision within its scope are illustrated by later cases. See, eg., Butler
v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1214 (1990) (rule barring police-initiated interrogation following a
suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation deemed new even though other
courts anticipated the decision); Safile v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990) (rule requiring that
jurors be allowed to base a capital sentencing decision on sympathy labelled new); Sawyer v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2822, 2828 (1990) (rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), that a prosecutor
may not seek to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility in capital sentencing decisions, held to be
new).
29. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305; see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
30. Justice Harlan stated:
[Tihe threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with estab-
lished constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function, the habeas
court need not, as prior cases make clear, necessarily apply all "new" constitutional rules
retroactively. In these cases, the habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards
that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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therefore the federal courts should defer to the states whenever the state
court faithfully applied the law existing at the time of the trial. Others,
including Justice Brennan in his dissent in Teague, feel just as passion-
ately that the function of habeas corpus is to ensure that the conviction
or sentence complies with the dictates of the Constitution, regardless of
the good faith of the state courts. 31 It is this fundamental disagreement
over the purpose of habeas corpus that is at the root of the disagreement
between the Justices; those Justices who feel that the Great Writ was
designed to serve both purposes will likely become the swing votes in
future decisions.
The language of Justice Harlan's rule is important to note: "[N]ew
rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review." 32 The use of "generally" was not without meaning; Justice
Harlan recognized two exceptions to his rule, the first being that "a new
rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe.' ,,33 The Teague plurality adopted this exception
without alteration. 34 The second exception recognized that "a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those pro-
cedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' -35 This
second exception was applied by the plurality "with a modification" 36-
replacing the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" formulation
with a narrower "watershed rules of criminal procedure" construction. 37
31. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The legislative history surrounding
the federal habeas corpus statute provides no clear answer to this dispute; one commentator, how-
ever, has observed that "[a]t the most elementary level, a statute passed in 1867 that expands federal
jurisdiction over the state criminal justice system is not hard to read. The agenda of Congress in
1867 was clear, and deference to state criminal courts was not on it." Michael E. Tigar, Habeas
Corpus and the Penalty of Death, 90 COLUM. L. Rav. 255, 269 (1990) (reviewing JAMES S. LIEB-
MAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988)). For a discussion of the
history of and controversy over habeas corpus, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, §§ 15.1-.2.
32. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (opinion of Harlan,
J.)). However, this exception would be met only in the rarest of cases; in fact, the Court itself is
hard-pressed to come up with examples. See id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (permitting petitioner's claim that mentally handicapped persons
should be exempt from the death penalty to fall within the first exception).
34. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. Although the Court simply stated that the first exception was
not applicable in this case, the implication was that it would have been used if it were. Later cases
explicitly adopt this first exception. See Penry, 492 U.S.. at 329 (1989).
35. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (opin-
ion of Harlan, J.)). The Court's paradigm example of such a rule is the Gideon v. Wainwright re-
quirement of appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1264
(1990).
36. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. This "modification" prompted Justice Stevens to write a separate
concurring opinion. See id. at 318 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
37. Id. at 311.
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The Teague plurality justified this alteration by asserting that Justice
Harlan had not intended to use the words he chose: "The language used
by Justice Harlan ... leaves no doubt that he meant the second exception
to be reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure. ' 38 Of course,
as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion, there is indeed
substantial doubt as to what Justice Harlan meant; Justice Stevens pre-
ferred to assume that the learned Justice meant exactly what he said.39
The plurality defended its modification on the grounds that the
phrase "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was simply borrowed
by Justice Harlan from Palko v. Connecticut,40 and should not be applied
outside the realm of incorporation doctrine.41 Further, the Court noted
that since Justice Harlan formulated his test, "our cases have moved in
the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convic-
tions in determining the available scope of habeas review."'42 Thus, the
plurality concluded that the second exception applied only "to those new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seri-
ously diminished. '43
The result of the Teague decision was that the framework for review
of habeas corpus petitions had been redesigned, but not completely set-
tled. After Teague, the doctrine stood as follows: A presumption of
non-retroactivity, and hence against consideration, attached to every
"new" claim raised in a petition for habeas corpus. If the claim at issue
were not "new," there would be no barrier to a hearing on the merits.
Unfortunately, the Teague court provided two very different definitions
of "new," each subject to its own interpretation, 44 and both very broad.
If the claim was indeed classified as "new," the presumption against con-
sideration on the merits could be overcome only if one of two exceptions
were satisfied. The first allowed a consideration on the merits if the de-
sired rule would place the individual conduct in question beyond the en-
forcement power of the state, that is, if the rule sought would declare
certain activity legal rather than illegal. The second exception allowed
38. Id.
39. See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
40. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko was the first case to advocate the theory of selective incorpora-
tion, whereby the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was deemed to have made only
certain portions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
41. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 ("Were we to employ the Palko test without more, we would
be doing little more than importing into a very different context the terms of the debate over incorpo-
ration. . . .Reviving the Palko test now, in this area of the law, would be unnecessarily
anachronistic.").
42. Id. at 313. In his dissent, Justice Brennan took issue with the cases cited by the plurality in
support of this position. See id. at 337 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 313.
44. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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consideration on the merits if the rule sought was a "watershed rule of
criminal procedure" or if it implicated "those new procedures without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."
Announced in February of 1989, Teague settled the issue for only four
months.
II. APPLICATION OF TEAGUE IN THE CAPITAL CONTEXT
Although the Teague opinion stated that it did not "express any
views as to how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be ap-
plied in the capital sentencing context,"'45 it went on to do just that:
We do, however, disagree with Justice Stevens' suggestion that the fi-
nality concerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity
are limited to making convictions final, and are therefore wholly inap-
plicable to the capital sentencing context .... Collateral challenges to
the sentence in a capital case, like collateral challenges to the sentence
in a non-capital case, delay the enforcement of the judgment at issue
and decrease the possibility that "there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation."'46
In late June of the 1988 Term, the Court faced its first opportunity
to apply the Teague doctrine in a capital case. That case, Penry v.
Lynaugh,47 had been argued before Teague was decided, so, as in
Teague, the Court addressed the retroactivity issue without benefit of
briefing or discussion by the parties. Once again, Justice O'Connor deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court; once again, her opinion was not joined by
a majority. In fact, no other Justice joined Justice O'Connor's full opin-
ion. However, four other Justices did join a critical section of the opin-
ion that stated that the Teague doctrine applied to capital as well as non-
capital cases. 48
After disingenuously stating that Teague had expressed no views on
retroactivity for capital cases, the Penry Court dispensed with the issue in
one sentence: "In our view, the finality concerns underlying Justice
Harlan's approach to retroactivity are applicable in the capital sentenc-
ing context, as are the two exceptions to his general rule of nonretroactiv-
ity."49 Thus, in that single sentence, a majority of the Supreme Court
45. Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.3.
46. Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (other
quotations omitted). Although the Teague plurality may have supported this proposition, if they are
insinuating that Justice Harlan did as well, that contention is not supported by Sanders. Sanders
was not a capital case (the petitioner there was challenging his 15-year sentence for bank robbery),
and so it is misleading for the Teague Court to append Justice Harlan's phrase to an assertion that
capital and non-capital cases should be treated equivalently.
47. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). For a fuller discussion of Penry, see supra sources cited in note 17.
48. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 314; id. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 314 (citation omitted).
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decided that procedural retroactivity issues were paramount to the assur-
ance of a constitutionally valid sentence that would result in the infliction
of the ultimate punishment.
The end result of Penry belies the invidiousness of its rule. The
Court held that a rule sought by Penry relating to jury instructions re-
garding mitigating evidence was "dictated" by prior precedent (and thus
was not a "new rule"), 50 and that a separate claim brought by Penry fell
within the first Teague exception, and as such could be considered on the
merits.51 Thus, the case was remanded for further consideration. In
fact, as supporters of Justice O'Connor's opinion would point out, the
Court expressly modified the language of the first Teague exception to
accommodate Penry's claim.52 That modification is slight, however, and
will not appreciably affect the operation of the rule for the majority of
criminal defendants.
Penry generated vigorous dissents from both "wings" of the bench.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the Eighth
Amendment barred the execution of the mentally retarded,5 3 and took
the majority to task for their extension of the Teague doctrine to capital
cases:
This extension means that a person may be killed although he or she
has a sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her
execution had this Court only announced the constitutional rule before
his or her conviction and sentence became final. It is intolerable that
the difference between life and death should turn on such a fortuity of
timing, and beyond my comprehension that a majority of this Court
will so blithely allow a State to take a human life though the method
by which sentence was determined violates our Constitution.54
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, stated in a brief opinion that
he did "not support the Court's assertion, without benefit of argument or
briefing on the issue, that Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to cap-
ital cases."155
Justice Scalia also dissented, but from a different portion of the opin-
ion than did Justice Brennan. Justice Scalia viewed Justice O'Connor's
50. See id. at 319.
51. See id. at 330.
52. Specifically, the Court stated: "Mhe first exception set forth in Teague should be under-
stood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also
rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense." Id. Penry, who was mentally retarded, claimed that the execution of mentally retarded
defendants violated the Eighth Amendment regardless of the procedures followed. The Court re-
jected this contention on the merits, stating that no national consensus against the execution of the
mentally retarded had yet developed. See id. at 335.
53. See id. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id.
55. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Vol. 41:160]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
slightly permissive interpretation of the "new rule" definition as an ill-
advised retreat from the dictates of Teague: "It is rare that a principle of
law as significant as that in Teague is adopted and gutted in the same
Term."' 56 Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Kennedy, thus leaving the "conservatives" just
one vote shy of a majority.
Justice O'Connor's opinion did little to clarify the definitional ambi-
guities within the Teague doctrine. Early in the opinion, Justice
O'Connor seemed to adopt yet a third formulation of the "new rule"
definition, this one taken from one of Justice Harlan's decisions.5 7 How-
ever, in the holding of the opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the rule
sought by Penry was "not a 'new rule' under Teague because it is dic-
tated by [prior precedent],"5 8 thereby adopting the arguably more re-
strictive "dictated by prior precedent" definition of what constitutes a
new rule. As to the two exceptions, the definition of the first was ex-
panded by the Court,59 whereas the second was not implicated in the
case and therefore not referenced.
Of more than passing interest is the suggestion by Justice Scalia that
"a 'new rule,' for purposes of Teague, must include not only a new rule
that replaces an old one, but a new rule that replaces palpable uncer-
tainty as to what the rule might be." 6 Justice Scalia, then, proposed that
the word "dictated" be taken literally, and that if any doubt existed as to
the result of the petitioner's claim, it would be denominated as "new."
III. THE 1989 TERM: CLARIFICATION AND LIMITATION
A. Butler v. McKellar
At the end of the 1988 Term, Penry remained the Court's last word
on retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings. However, the fact that
four Justices would have broadened the definition of "new" while limit-
ing the scope of the exceptions, and that four other Justices were upset at
the application of Teague to capital cases without benefit of briefing or
56. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. See id. at 314 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 695 (1971) (separate opinion
of Harlan, 3.)):
Justice Harlan recognized "the inevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting to deter-
mine whether a particular decision has really announced a 'new' rule at all or whether it
has simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is
closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law."
58. Id. at 319.
59. See id. at 341; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60. Penry, 492 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This position
is noteworthy because it is ultimately adopted by a majority of the Court, but in an even broader
form: The new definition essentially removes the qualifier "palpable," allowing any uncertainty to
suffice. See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).
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argument, signaled that clarification was needed. The opportunity
presented itself shortly into the 1989 Term; in Butler v. McKellar,61 the
Court defined what constituted a "new rule" more clearly, if not more
fairly.
In Butler, the petitioner was arrested by police on an assault and
battery charge. After invoking his right to counsel, he was represented
by a court-appointed lawyer at a bond hearing on the charge. Butler was
later informed, while still in custody, that he was a suspect in an unre-
lated murder. He was read his Miranda rights, stated that he understood
them, and signed two "waiver of rights" forms. Butler was then interro-
gated by police concerning the murder, at which time he gave two con-
flicting accounts of his involvement in the case. These statements were
admitted, over objection, at Butler's trial, and he was subsequently con-
victed and sentenced to death. 62 His conviction became final when the
Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct appeal in 1982.63
After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction remedies, Butler
filed a petition for habeas corpus in 1986. That petition was dismissed on
the State's motion for summary judgment, and Butler appealed.64 On
appeal, Butler claimed that the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v.
Arizona,65 which forbids the police from questioning a suspect about a
particular offense once the suspect has exercised his right to counsel for
that offense,66 required the police to refrain from any questioning once a
defendant invokes his right to counsel on any offense. In support of this
contention, Butler relied upon a Seventh Circuit case that had reached
basically the same conclusion.6 7 Unfortunately for Butler, his case was
being heard by the Fourth Circuit, which rejected the Seventh Circuit's
decision as unpersuasive.68 On the same day that the Fourth Circuit de-
nied Butler's petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court decided Arizona
v. Roberson,69 which adopted Butler's contentions concerning the per-
missible scope of interrogation after a request for counsel has been
made.70 Naturally, Butler moved for a reconsideration, which the
Fourth Circuit denied (over a dissent), stating that the limitations on
61. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
62. Id. at 1215.
63. Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932 (1982).
64. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1215.
65. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
66. See id. at 484-85.
67. United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 126-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1010 (1987).
68. See Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1988).
69. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
70. See id. at 677-78.
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police interrogation were only tangentially related to the truth-finding
function.71 Butler then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The primary question presented in Butler was whether Roberson
represented a new rule, or whether its result was dictated by the Court's
1981 holding in Edwards. If the former, Butler would not be heard on
the merits unless he could satisfy one of the two Teague exceptions; 72 if
the latter, his petition would be considered in full 73 (and, on the facts as
presented, almost certainly granted). The petitioner argued that the fac-
tual distinctions between Roberson and Edwards were de minimis, and
insufficient to implicate any state reliance issue.74 Indeed, in Roberson,
the Court had adopted the Arizona Supreme Court's reasoning that
"[t]he only difference between Edwards and the appellant is that Ed-
wards was questioned about the same offense after a request for counsel
while the appellant was reinterrogated about an unrelated offense. We
do not believe that this factual distinction holds any legal significance for
fifth amendment purposes."' 75 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found
this factual distinction sufficient to create a new rule, and affirmed But-
ler's conviction without reaching the merits.76
Initially, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the important difference be-
tween the two formulations of the "new rule" definition:
[I]n general, a case announces a "new rule" when it breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.
Put differently, and, indeed, more meaningfully for the majority of
cases, a decision announces a new rule "if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final." 77
After quoting extensively from Teague, he then concluded that
"[t]he 'new rule' principle therefore validates reasonable, good-faith in-
terpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. 78 In support of this
71. See Butler v. Aiken, 864 F.2d 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1988). The Fourth Circuit's decision was
made before Teague, and matters such as the relation to the truth-finding function were still proper
subjects for discussion under the Linkletter standards. See supra note 20.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
73. See supra text accompanying note 44.
74. Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990) (No. 88-6677).
75. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting State v. Routhier, 669 P.2d 68, 75 (Ariz. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984)).
76. The decision was 5-4, with Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joining Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens (Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined all but section IV of Justice Brennan's
opinion, which reiterated his categorical opposition to the death penalty). See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at
1214.
77. Id. at 1216 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989)).
78. Id. at 1217.
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position, the Chief Justice provided a cf cite to United States v. Leon, 79
which involved a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In an
attached parenthetical, the Butler Court explained the deterrence func-
tion of the exclusionary rule, and how it would not be served by keeping
out evidence obtained by "objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity." 80
The only plausible explanation for the Chief Justice's conclusion is
that at least five Justices of the Court now believe that the primary pur-
pose of the writ of habeas corpus is to deter state court misconduct, and
that therefore state courts should not be held accountable via habeas
corpus in any manner that would not further that end. If this premise is
accepted, Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is easier to understand, be-
cause a "good-faith" inquiry into the state court's decision would serve
the desired deterrence function. The Court went on to say that even if a
court explicitly states that its decision is "controlled" by a prior decision,
such an assertion is not dispositive for "new rule" determinations. 81 As
long as "the outcome in Roberson was susceptible to debate among rea-
sonable minds,"' 82 that outcome constituted a "new rule."
Not surprisingly, this restructuring of the "new rule" definition to
include virtually every case worthy of the Court's attention provoked a
lengthy and vehement dissent. For adherents to the view that the Great
Writ exists not to police the states but to remedy injustice, these develop-
ments were a crushing blow. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,8 3 attacked the majority's new formu-
lation on the grounds that every case decided by the Court would an-
nounce a new rule unless a contrary outcome "could not be defended by
any reasonable jurist."'84
The dissenters noted that, under this expansive "new rule" defini-
tion, the federal courts are only allowed to inquire into whether the state
court's legal analysis can be justified in any reasonable manner
79. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon concerned whether the prophylactic requirements of the exclu-
sionary rule should apply where the police officers hold a good faith belief as to the probable cause
supporting the warrant. The Court, after a thorough discussion of the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, decided that it should not. See id. at 918-19.
80. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217. The Chief Justice's reasoning is surprising considering that no
comparison between the exclusionary rule and the Great Writ had ever been so much as suggested.
Except for sharing a common word in their purpose (deterrence), the exclusionary rule and the writ
of habeas corpus are totally unrelated. The former is an evidentiary rule, designed wholly by the
courts to remedy violations of the Fourth Amendment, whereas the latter is a constitutional guaran-
tee, implemented by congressional enactment to prevent the unconstitutional detention of citizens.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1218 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1219.
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whatsoever." This is equivalent to review under a "clearly erroneous"
standard, which would prevent the district courts from conducting their
own analyses of the prevailing law at the time the petitioner's conviction
became final. Instead, they "must defer to the state court's decision re-
jecting the claim unless that decision is patently unreasonable." 86
The majority's expansion of the "new rule" definition thus elimi-
nates the very rationale they designed it to support. That rationale was
intended to deter state court deviations from federal constitutional law.
Indeed, the majority rejected the rationale that "fairness" rather than
"deterrence" is the goal.8 7 Yet the deterrence function embraced by the
majority is actually weakened by the broadened definition. State courts
need not decide federal constitutional claims "correctly," as advocated
by the Teague plurality;88 rather, they must only evaluate such claims
"reasonably. ' 89 Thus, state courts have little incentive to interpret con-
scientiously federal constitutional law; they may decide such cases with-
out consideration of marginally distinguishable precedent. State courts
may thus rest easy, secure in the knowledge that their reasoning will not
be challenged by a habeas corpus petition, provided that their ultimate
position does not prove indefensible under existing law.
Because the primary issue of the case related to the definition of
"new," the Butler majority made very little mention of the two excep-
tions that are implicated if the claim is indeed deemed "new." 90 The
majority did explicitly recognize the Penry expansion of the first excep-
tion,91 and quoted extensively from Teague with respect to the second. 92
As to the second exception, the Court determined that a violation of the
Roberson restrictions "would not seriously diminish the likelihood of ob-
taining an accurate determination. ' 93 No mention is made of the more
restrictive "watershed rules of criminal procedure" version of the second
exception, and so one might think that the accepted definition for the
second exception had been settled, along with the rest of the doctrine.
This was not the case.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 1221.
87. See id. at 1217.
88. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989).
89. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1223 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 1218.
91. See id.
92. See id
93. Id.
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B. Saffle v. Parks
On the same day that Butler was decided, the Court announced its
decision in Saffle v. Parks.94 Parks was convicted of the murder of a gas
station attendant, and prosecutors for the state of Oklahoma sought the
death penalty. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge instructed
the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy when determining Parks's
sentence. After finding a statutory aggravating circumstance, the jury
sentenced Parks to death.95 Parks's conviction became final in 1983
when the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.96 Parks then
filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the anti-sympa-
thy instruction violated the Eighth Amendment, in that it effectively told
the jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Parks had presented. Parks
lost in the District Court and in a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit on
appeal,97 but prevailed upon rehearing en banc.98
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy crafted his own version of
the "new rule" definition, stating that a rule would be considered new
unless a state court "would have felt compelled by existing precedent to
conclude that the rule... [sought] was required by the Constitution." 99
The impotence of this definition to provide any petitioner with relief is
illustrated by the Court's analysis of Parks's legal argument.
Parks based his Eighth Amendment argument on two cases, Lockett
v. Ohio 100 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,101 both of which were decided
before Parks's conviction became final. These cases stated that the sen-
tencing body (judge or jury) could not refuse as a matter of law to con-
sider any mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, regardless of
whether such mitigating factors were delineated as such by statute. The
judge's instruction, argued Parks, directly contravened this principle by
forbidding the jury to allow sympathy to affect their determination.10 2
94. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990). As might be expected, the court split 5-4, see id at 1258, in pre-
cisely the same manner as it had in Butler. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1214.
95. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1259.
96. Parks v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
97. Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1988).
98. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
99. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.
100. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
101. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
102. Parks's contentions had already been considered by the Supreme Court in California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987). There, the Court upheld an anti-sympathy instruction, but on the basis
that the word "sympathy" was only one of many factors the judge had instructed the jury to avoid,
and thus did not impermissibly limit the jury's consideration of mitigating factors. By negative
implication, however, if the judge specifically instructed the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy,
as he did in Parks, the Brown holding would not protect such an instruction. However, because
Brown came after Parks's conviction became final, he could not benefit from it unless it came within
one of the two exceptions to the rule against retroactive application. Parks's counsel made no at-
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Justice Kennedy determined that the rule sought by Parks concerned not
what evidence could be considered, as did Lockett and Eddings, but how
that evidence must be considered, to which Lockett and Eddings did not
"speak directly." 10 3 Thus, since that distinction existed, Parks was re-
questing a new rule. The Court made very clear just how enormous a
barrier it had erected with its "new rule" formulation: "Even were we to
agree with Parks' assertion that our decisions in Lockett and Eddings
inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of his claim, it does not
follow that they compel the rule that Parks seeks."' 4
As a matter of deductive reasoning, it is impossible to draw a dis-
tinction between cases that control or govern a case and those that com-
pel a particular result. If a case is deemed controlling, it dictates the
result, absent a judicial departure. from stare decisis. The distinction is
merely semantic mumbo-jumbo, and illustrates the lengths to which the
majority was willing to go to denominate Parks's claim as "new."
Having thus determined that Parks sought the benefit of a new rule,
the Court addressed the exceptions to the general prohibition against de-
ciding such cases. The first was clearly inapplicable to Parks, as his re-
quested rule would neither decriminalize murder nor prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular class of persons. 105 As to
the second, Justice Kennedy adopted the "watershed rules of criminal
procedure" version and held that Parks's claim did not come within its
bounds. 106 In so doing, Justice Kennedy ignored the "diminish the likeli-
hood of an accurate determination" formulation adopted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist earlier in the day. It appeared that the Court had decided that
the two formulations were functionally equivalent, and thus could be
used interchangeably. Neither opinion discussed any potential difference
between the definitions, and so both remained in force-for the time
being.
C. Sawyer v. Smith
Any doubts surrounding the scope of the second exception were re-
solved by Sawyer v. Smith, 10 7 the Court's final retroactivity decision of
the 1989 Term. In September of 1980, Sawyer was found guilty of first-
degree murder in the gruesome death of a roommate of Sawyer's girl-
tempt, however, to fit within either one; in fact, retroactivity was not discussed in the briefs at all by
either party, nor by the State of California as amicus, although it was discussed at oral argument.
103. Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1261.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1263.
106. See id. at 1263-64.
107. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). As in both Butler and Parks, the Court split 5-4, with the same
Justices on each side. See id. at 2824.
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friend. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution repeat-
edly told the jury that its sentencing decision would be reviewed by a
higher court, and that any error would thereby be corrected. The jury
subsequently sentenced Sawyer to death.108 Sawyer's conviction became
final in 1984 when, after a previous remand, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.109 One year later, in Caldwell v. Mississippi,110 the Supreme
Court held that any jury argument by the prosecution that diminishes
the jury's sense of responsibility in a capital case violates the Eighth
Amendment.1 1 Sawyer's petition for habeas corpus was filed shortly
thereafter.
Unlike Butler and Parks, Sawyer had no reasonable argument that
the decision in Caldwell, upon which he relied, was not a new rule; a
previous Supreme Court case had rejected the suggestion that the Cald-
well rule was required by the Eighth Amendment,1 2 so Caldwell's hold-
ing was a complete reversal of earlier precedent. Because Caldwell was
decided after Sawyer's conviction became final, he could only prevail if
he could qualify for retroactive application under one of the two excep-
tions.113 As in the cases earlier in the Term, the first was unavailing,114
in that the Caldwell rule did not legalize murder, nor did it prevent the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular class of persons. The
second exception thus became the battleground.
Sawyer was not without ammunition for his assault. One of the rea-
sons the Court granted certiorari was to resolve a conflict within the cir-
cuits regarding the scope of the second exception,115 and so Sawyer had
the decision of at least one federal circuit (the Tenth) on his side. Fur-
ther, as noted earlier, the second exception had been defined in at least
two different ways in the past,116 and had not been fully interpreted to
this point-giving Sawyer the opportunity to argue for a favorable con-
struction. Also, the equities of the situation favored Sawyer; it could not
be gainsaid that the Caldwell rule had been violated in his case, which
108. Id. at 2825.
109. Sawyer v. Louisiana, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
110. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
111. See id at 328-29.
112. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983).
113. Justice Kennedy initially dealt with the "new rule" question; however, given the dictates of
Butler and Parks, this was clearly a perfunctory exercise. Indeed, even under a narrow definition of
the term, the Caldwell rule was undoubtedly "new."
114. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831.
115. See Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that
the Caldwell rule fell within the second exception); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1294 (5th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (holding that the Caldwell rule did not fall within the second exception).
116. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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violation would have certainly constituted reversible error had the case
been presented on direct appeal.
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy adopted the "water-
shed rules of criminal procedure" construction of the second exception,
as he had done in Parks. The full language of Justice Kennedy's defini-
tion is important to note: "The second Teague exception applies to new
'watershed rules of criminal procedure' that are necessary to the funda-
mental fairness of the criminal proceeding."'1 17 Thus, the Kennedy ver-
sion of the second exception has two requirements: the rule must be
"watershed," and it must implicate the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding.
It was this duality that proved fatal to Sawyer's petition. The Court
refused to read the second exception to include new rules of capital sen-
tencing that only "preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentenc-
ing judgments." 118 According to the majority, such a reading would
return the second exception to the broad definition originally supported
by Justice Harlan, which they were unwilling to do:
It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at
improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that quali-
fies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also al-
ter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of a proceeding.1 19
Justice Kennedy further stated that because the Caldwell rule merely
provided an incremental safeguard to due process protections already in
place,120 it did not qualify as a bedrock procedural element, and therefore
that Sawyer's petition was not entitled to a hearing on the merits.121
D. Status of the Doctrine
At the close of the 1989 Term, the Supreme Court's retroactivity
doctrine for habeas corpus proceedings stood as follows: If the habeas
petitioner is claiming the benefit of a "new rule," then that rule's result
will not be applied retroactively, and the court will not hear the claim on
the merits, unless one of two exceptions are met. Three important defini-
tions need to be noted: (1) the definition of a "new rule"; (2) the formu-
117. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990)).
118. Id.
119. Id. (quotation omitted).
120. The Court noted that Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), already provided
relief for defendants when they could demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks had made the pro-
ceeding fundamentally unfair. Thus, according to the majority, defendants need only resort to Cald-
well when Donnelly proves unavailing. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832.
121. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832.
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lation of the first exception to the presumption against hearing "new
rule" cases; and (3) the second exception to that presumption.
"New rules" are defined as "those that were not dictated by prece-
dent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." '122 Put
another way, a rule is "new" unless a state court considering the rule at
the time the petitioner's conviction became final would have felt com-
pelled by existing precedent to decide that the rule sought was required
by the Constitution. 123 Such compulsion could only come from a defini-
tive interpretation by the Supreme Court on the issue; decisions from
lower federal courts or other state courts would be insufficient. There-
fore, if a habeas petitioner seeks to rely on a Supreme Court case, the
question of "newness" has ipso facto been resolved against him: The
Supreme Court would not have bothered to grant certiorari in the earlier
case had the issue already been definitively resolved; thus, whatever case
is being relied on must be "new." The end result is that, for all intents
and purposes, every rule from a Supreme Court case is "new."
Since its modification in Penry, the language of the first exception
has remained the same: A new rule will nevertheless be applied retroac-
tively if it either places "an entire category of primary conduct beyond
the reach of the criminal law"124 or if it prohibits "imposition of a certain
type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense."' 125 The opportunities for application of this exception will be
few and far between (Penry notwithstanding), so its importance should
not be overstated.
Two formulations of the second exception were used by the Court
during the 1989 Term, although the second seems to have been adopted
as controlling. In Butler, Chief Justice Rehnquist defined the exception
to include only those new procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished.1 26 However, in Parks, and
again in Sawyer, Justice Kennedy was careful to include within the sec-
ond exception only those watershed rules of criminal procedure that are
necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding.'
27
Under the Rehnquist formulation, a rule that substantially improves ac-
curacy will be included, whereas under the Kennedy version, only those
rules required for the fairness of the proceeding may qualify, and then
only if they are considered to be "bedrock" rules of criminal procedure.
122. Id. at 2827 (quotation omitted).
123. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990).
124. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831.
125. Id.
126. See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990).
127. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831; Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1263.
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Clearly, the second of these would be the most difficult to meet, as the
petitioner must overcome two substantial barriers, rather than a single
(arguably lower) one.
IV. THE CASE FOR DISPARATE TREATMENT OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
This Note argues that the Supreme Court failed to adequately con-
sider the unique nature of capital punishment when it applied its retroac-
tivity doctrine to capital sentencing cases. 128 The Court ignored over
fifteen years of its own jurisprudence that consistently labeled capital
punishment as qualitatively different from non-capital punishment, thus
entitling it to individualized application of otherwise general procedural
rules.
As a matter of common sense, a death sentence is fundamentally
different from even a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. The importance of the difference, however, goes much deeper:
Through its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the distinction between capital and non-capital sentencing is of constitu-
tional significance. Since the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 29
the Justices have struggled to define the permissible scope of state capital
sentencing statutes and procedures. In the process, the Court has deline-
ated everything from jury instructions 130 to prosecutorial arguments,' 31
from statutory aggravating circumstances 132 to mitigating factors' 33-all
to keep the death sentence from violating the dictates of the Constitution.
A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment has no cause to claim on
appeal that, for example, the jury was not allowed to consider his status
as a drug addict, solid citizen, wife-beater, or community volunteer when
it passed judgment. Yet one under sentence of death may claim just such
an error. Although many Justices of the current Court may disagree
with the path taken by prior Justices in fashioning this body of law, there
is general agreement on the Court that unique safeguards are required in
capital proceedings. Indeed, even one of the most "conservative" Jus-
tices recognizes the continuing validity of Furman, which demands that
128. The author claims no credit for this objection; see Parks, 110 S. Ct. at 1269-70 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. See Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988);
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
131. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
132. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985); Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
133. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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courts not have unbridled discretion in imposing the death penalty, yet
imposes no such restriction on the imposition of sentences of
incarceration. 134
In its most recent Term, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that
the death penalty fundamentally differs from a term of incarceration. In
Harmelin v. Michigan,135 the petitioner appealed a sentence of life in
prison without possibility of parole imposed for possession of more than
600 grams of cocaine. Although the primary basis for petitioner's appeal
was the alleged disproportionality of the sentence, 136 Harmelin also
claimed that the judge should have been required to consider various
mitigating factors when imposing sentence.137 In a section of the opinion
joined by five "conservative" Justices, 138 the Court stated that "[o]ur
cases creating and clarifying the 'individualized capital sentencing doc-
trine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no comparable requirement
outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference between
death and all other penalties."'139 The Court continued:
In some cases, moreover, there will be negligible difference between life
without parole and other sentences of imprisonment-for example, a
life sentence with eligibility for parole after 20 years, or even a lengthy
term sentence without eligibility for parole, given to a 65-year-old
man. But even where the difference is the greatest, it cannot be com-
pared with death. We have drawn the line of required individualized
sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further. 14
Thus, the recognition that capital punishment is qualitatively different
from all other forms of punishment is deeply entrenched within the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, Jus-
134. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3059 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judg-
ment). Justice Scalia's opinion may set the stage for future battles between the "conservative" and
"liberal" elements over the death penalty, because Justice Scalia expressly disavowed continued ad-
herence to the Court's requirement that a defendant may present any mitigating evidence whatso-
ever, and that any action on the part of the court to restrict such presentation constitutes reversible
error. According to Justice Scalia, Furman expressly requires more control over capital sentencing
proceedings, not less, and should not be solely restricted to control over aggravating circumstances.
See id. at 3064. Thus, attempts by states to dictate which mitigating factors are admissible should
not only be encouraged, but required. Justice Steveng wrote separately in the case just to address
and refute Justice Scalia's position. See id at 3086 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
136. See id. at 2684 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
137. See id. at 2701.
138. Justice Scalia was joined in this section by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter.
139. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (emphasis added).
140. Id.
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tice Blackmun has stated that the concept "is as firmly established as any
in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." 141
Unfortunately, with the notable exception of Harmelin, in recent
years the Court has not always paid heed to Justice Blackmun's admon-
ishment, although the dissenters have not been shy in instructing the ma-
jority as to the error of its ways. In 1990, the Court upheld Arizona's
capital sentencing procedures as consistent with the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 142 Among the aspects of the Arizona law was
the requirement that the defendant hold the burden of proof as to any
mitigating evidence he might submit. In affirming this requirement, the
Court relied, at least in part, upon prior non-capital cases in which place-
ment of the burden of proof on the defendant for a particular issue had
been upheld. In dissent, Justice Blackmun 43 took the majority to task:
[I]t makes no sense to analyze petitioner's claim... by drawing on
"analogous" cases outside the sphere of capital sentencing. In devel-
oping the requirement of individualized capital sentencing (with un-
limited presentation of relevant mitigating evidence), this Court has
not purported to rely on principles applicable to criminal prosecutions
generally. Instead, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence ex-
plicitly has proceeded from the premise "that death is a punishment
different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree." 144
It is against this backdrop that the error of the current retroactivity doc-
trine begins to take shape.
V. A MODIFIED APPROACH IN CAPITAL CASES
In the author's opinion the death penalty does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment per se. It is, however, the author's view that
141. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 924 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). There have been
numerous cases reiterating the same principle. Some have been majority opinions, see California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 272 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), others pluralities, see Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion), still others dissents, see Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1729-30 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1202 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704-05 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 306 (1983) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
142. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
143. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, a coalition that
repeatedly appears in dissent from many of the current Court's death penalty rulings. Of course,
with the replacement of Justice Brennan with Justice Souter, and the replacement of Justice Mar-
shall with Justice Thomas, that alliance faces an even steeper challenge to command a majority in
the future.
144. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
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such a sentence should be imposed only when the state has complied
with every procedural requirement of the Constitution, and only then
when the defendant has been given an opportunity for a meaningful
federal appeal. Further, it offends all core notions of civilization and de-
cency to execute a person under a prejudical sentence of death, simply
because the powers that be did not determine the existence of its prejudi-
cial nature until after the defendant had crossed the Rubicon (i.e., until
after his conviction had become final).145 As commentator Michael
Tigar has pointed out: "[A] death sentence [sh]ould only be carried out
if the standards of justice that led to it were fair as measured at the time
of the proposed execution, and not at the time of the crime or at some
point during the review process." 146
Thus, the existing doctrine in this area requires modification. One
could persuasively argue that the entire formulation should be thrown
out and a new theory be constructed from the ground up. As appealing
as that may sound to some, it has little practical usefulness, for it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would be willing to divorce itself from
the Teague doctrine after such a short honeymoon. A more promising
approach is to argue that, in the capital sentencing context, the underly-
ing reasons for the doctrine are less persuasive, that the consequences are
more dire, and that the Court's own jurisprudence dictates that a doc-
trine developed in a non-capital context should not be applied to capital
cases without consideration of the unique aspects of capital
jurisprudence.
In this vein, there are two potential avenues of attack to the Teague
doctrine's application in the capital sentencing context. On one flank is
the new rule definition; on the other is the second exception.147 Clearly,
under the current interpretation, the former offers little hope for petition-
ers. The more "conservative" members of the Court have made it quite
clear that their definition of "new" is nearly as broad as Madison Ave-
145. As a side issue, it is interesting to note the current majority's definition of "final." As
outlined by Joseph Hoffman, if the avowed purpose of habeas corpus is to deter state court miscon-
duct, then it makes absolutely no sense to use the date of a denial of certiorari as the demarcation of
finality. Rather, the date of the highest state court's decision would be more appropriate: Whatever
occurs in the intervening period between the state court decision and the filing of a petition for
certiorari is beyond the control of the states, and the granting of a habeas petition based on interven-
ing events can have no deterrent effect upon them. See Hoffman, New Vision, supra note 17, at 184-
85.
146. Tigar, supra note 31, at 272.
147. As noted earlier, the first exception-whereby a habeas petitioner invoking a new rule will
be heard on the merits if the rule in question would place particularized conduct beyond the power
of the state to proscribe, or prohibit a particular punishment for a particular class of persons-would
be met so infrequently that to rail against its narrowness would be a waste of breath; indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a broadened definition of the first exception that would meaningfully assist future
capital petitioners while retaining the same basic character as the current formulation.
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nue's, which permits every infinitesimal alteration in the formula for
Tide® to qualify for a splashy "NEW AND IMPROVED!!" label.
Accordingly, unless the rule in question is so completely determined by
prior precedent as to be beyond rational dispute, the Court will label it
"new." As a consequence, any brief that advocates a narrower definition
of "new" that would allow more habeas cases to be heard would require
the Court to reverse itself completely-something it is not likely to do
given that a reversal would be an admission of error on the part of the
same Justices who recently crafted the doctrine they would be
rejecting.148
As a matter of theoretical clarity, the Court is correct in taking an
extreme position in defining "new," although it very well could have
gravitated to the opposite pole. If "new" was allowed to mean "sorta
new" or "kinda new," the cases would possess no consistency, rarely a
desirable result. 149 Therefore, the Court should maintain its view of
"new," disadvantageous to petitioners though it may be, both to remove
uncertainty and to provide a sharp contrast with opposing views that
may later seek to modify or reject it.150
The better approach is to urge a modification of the second Teague
exception in capital sentencing cases. The flaw in the Supreme Court's
current interpretation of the second exception stems from its disregard of
fifteen years of its own jurisprudence that distinguished between capital
and non-capital cases when, in Penry, it applied Teague to death cases.
A reminder of this fact would provide a good precursor to the suggestion
that perhaps the Court was a bit hasty in its formulations, and that per-
haps an altered approach is in order. The last word on the subject comes
from Justice Kennedy's opinion in Sawyer, in which the Court made it
abundantly clear that it would not overrule the portion of Penry applying
Teague to capital cases. 151 Sawyer's counsel made a valiant effort to fit
his case within the exception, only to be rebuffed:
It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at
improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. "A rule that quali-
fies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'al-
ter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to
the fairness of a proceeding." 152
148. Further, two of the four dissenters in Teague (Justices Brennan and Marshall) have since
retired and have been replaced with Justices Souter and Thomas.
149. Except, of course, for attorneys, for whom unclear legal doctrines provide the pretext for
substantial numbers of billable hours.
150. Indeed, one might argue that the "newness" inquiry be dropped altogether, as it seems that
every rule will be found to be "new" whenever the issue is in question.
151. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2832 (1990).
152. Id. at 2831 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
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Returning (as scientists and mathematicians say) to first principles, what
is required is a reformulation of what are considered the "bedrock" pro-
cedural elements essential to the fairness of capital proceedings.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court is essentially to treat the
fair proceeding requirement as a simple algebraic sum. Under the
Court's reasoning, if all the "bedrock" procedural elements are present
and added together, the total is a fair proceeding. Accepting the Court's
mathematical model for the moment, it nonetheless suffers from two pri-
mary flaws in the area of capital sentencing. First, it presumes that the
elements of the sum remain constant between capital and non-capital
cases. Yet clearly they do not. Capital sentencing review requires a spe-
cific inquiry into the presentation and content of aggravating circum-
stances and mitigating factors at the sentencing phase of the trial, as well
as any judicial instructions on how to apply those factors. The basis for
Sawyer's claim provides a specific example. No case has yet stated that
the mention of the appellate process to the jury in a non-capital case
constitutes reversible error; indeed, the reasoning and rationale of Cald-
well effectively precludes that result.1 53 But by focusing on the impor-
tance of the decision to be made by the jury (death versus life), the Court
in Caldwell determined that any implication of a lack of final responsibil-
ity for their verdict is impermissible. 154 Thus, the nature of the
prosecutorial argument becomes relevant to any review of the resulting
death sentence. Had Sawyer been sentenced to life in prison without pos-
sibility of parole, that aspect of the prosecutor's argument would not
have assisted Sawyer's appeal. Therefore, the pieces that enter into a
determination of the fairness of a death sentence are more numerous and
more closely scrutinized than are those that enter into the imposition of a
term of incarceration.
Second, the Court presumes that the quantum of fairness required is
identical between capital and non-capital proceedings. In other words,
the Court feels that if the sum of the safeguards provided in non-capital
cases ensures fairness, then providing the same elements would do so in
capital cases. This ignores the plethora of opinions noted above that
draw the qualitative distinction between capital and non-capital cases
and the correspondingly disparate levels of review that accompany
each. 1 55 Clearly, the capital defendant is entitled to a heightened require-
ment of fairness before he is executed; the problem lies in defining that
level. Under the Court's current theory, the level of fairness is defined by
the sum of its parts; it possesses no independent value. Working within
153. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
154. See id. at 341.
155. See supra note 141.
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that framework, then, there should be more safeguards provided in crim-
inal cases before their combination will be deemed to have provided a
"fair" proceeding.
Therefore, the Court should re-examine both what it considers to be
the procedures inherently required in death penalty proceedings, and the
number and value of these safeguards necessary to reach the requisite
level of fairness. One response to this proposition is that the Court has
already performed the first inquiry, rejecting the claims of Butler, Parks,
and Sawyer as not involving "bedrock procedural elements." One could
say that, although the level of fairness in capital cases is indeed higher
than that of non-capital proceedings, or that the factors involved are dif-
ferent, the procedural safeguards already in place meet or exceed any
required fairness level, and so any further "fine tuning" could not possi-
bly be considered "bedrock." This is the Court's contention in Sawyer:
"As we stated in Teague, because the second exception is directed only at
new rules essential to the accuracy and fairness of the criminal process, it
is unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to
emerge."156
Yet the Sawyer analysis disregards the dichotomy between those
procedural elements essential to all criminal proceedings and those essen-
tial to capital sentencing proceedings. The inquiry into the basic proce-
dural requirements for general criminal cases has continued since the
development of incorporation doctrine. During this time, the Court has
determined, on an issue-by-issue basis, which procedural safeguards are
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This pro-
cess dates back to at least 1937,157 and possibly as far back as 1908.158
Thus, the Court has had over fifty years to develop the body of general
criminal procedural law. In contrast, modem death penalty jurispru-
dence is less than twenty years old, dating back only to 1972,159 and the
area is far from settled. Indeed, the volatile state of capital punishment
law is the very reason for the current conundrum: Were the doctrine
well-settled, cases such as Arizona v. Roberson, 60 California v. Brown,161
and Caldwell v. Mississippi 1 62 would have been decided years ago, and
defendants like Butler, Parks, and Sawyer would not have been caught in
the middle. The Supreme Court is still deciding what is and is not per-
missible in capital cases, and so to assert that very few "components of
156. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832 (quotation omitted).
157. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
158. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
159. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
160. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
161. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
162. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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basic due process have yet to emerge" in this area ignores the continuing
development and refinement of those components.
To adequately address the differences between capital and non-capi-
tal proceedings, any flaw that the Court would deem to constitute revers-
ible error should be defined as "bedrock" in capital cases. Any other
definition suffers from the incurable infirmity of requiring an ostensibly
objective valuation of each procedural protection afforded a capital de-
fendant. Such quantification is utterly impossible. The Court has repeat-
edly stated that one "bedrock" element is the assistance of counsel. Yet
if that counsel is wholly ineffective, what is the use of his presence?
Thus, effective assistance of counsel must be taken into account. But
even the most eloquent attorney is nearly powerless to overcome bla-
tantly prejudicial jury instructions, and so judicial statements to the jury
must also be considered "bedrock." And on and on it goes. Each proce-
dural protection works in conjunction with every other one, with the re-
sult being a fair trial. If the Court has determined that a particular
protection is required to ensure fairness, it makes no sense to inquire
whether that section is more fundamentally necessary than any other;
they are all required.
A more appropriate analogy for the achievement of fairness in capi-
tal sentencing cases would be an electric circuit, not a simple sum. Each
procedural safeguard is a conductor, connected with each other one, car-
rying the current that "lights" the "fairness bulb." If one section is re-
moved, the light goes out. In some cases, the broken circuit may be
patched through remedial jury instructions or skilled argument by de-
fense counsel, but in those cases fairness will have been ensured. There is
no middle ground: Either the light is on or it is off; either a trial is fair or
it is not. In Butler, Parks, and Sawyer, the Court seems to imply that,
had the safeguards in question been provided to the petitioners, their re-
spective trials would have been "more fair," but that the trials as they
occurred were "fair enough." Yet the same could have been said of Rob-
erson and Caldwell, in which the Court vacated the petitioners' death
sentences. The Court is fond of saying that a criminal defendant is enti-
tled to "a fair trial, not a perfect one"; 163 yet, if the safeguards sought by
Butler, Parks, and Sawyer were elements of perfection rather than fair-
ness, how can the holdings of Roberson and Caldwell be explained? They
simply cannot. Those cases announced elements held by the Court to be
required to ensure fair capital sentencing procedures; had they been
deemed elements of perfection, the Court would not have found them
necessary in the first place. Thus, the only distinction between Butler,
163. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); accord Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81,
91 (1988); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 510 n.3 (1987); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
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Parks, and Sawyer on the one hand, and Roberson and Caldwell on the
other, lies in the procedural posture of their cases. Allowing three men
to be put to death while two others receive new sentencing hearings,
solely because of a fortuity of timing, cannot be condoned. 164
As the Court refines its death penalty jurisprudence, it is constantly
redefining the circuit path, sometimes extending it, at other times shunt-
ing it (as Justice Scalia's opinion in Walton advocates 65). If a habeas
corpus petitioner presents a model of his sentencing hearing that lacks
the required components as currently defined by the Court, that hearing
was unfair, and the second exception should permit the Court to reach
the merits. The only other approach is the one apparently adopted by
the Court, which argues that nothing could possibly come along that
would qualify as "bedrock." If this is the case, why retain the ostensible
exception? It would be of no use to anyone, and would be useless deci-
sional baggage. We must operate on the assumption that the exception
would not exist if it were not to be used, and the area of capital sentenc-
ing provides a perfect example of when it should be invoked. Thus, any
procedural error found to have prejudiced the defendant during the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case in which the defendant was sentenced to
death has affected the fairness of the proceeding in a manner that man-
dates its reversal.
Opponents of this suggestion will be quick to allege its disadvan-
tages. Supporters of the death penalty have long maintained that a pri-
mary failure of the system has been prolonged appeals and reversals on
"technicalities" that limit the deterrent effect of the sanction. Yet there
is no evidence that stepped-up execution rates contribute to a reduction
in capital crimes. 166
At a more pragmatic level, some feel that repeated habeas petitions
by death row inmates needlessly delay inevitable executions and waste
valuable federal court time and resources. 167 Yet this concern has been
164. Had the Court recognized the procedural problems in the cases of Butler, Parks, and Saw-
yer when they were presented on direct review, no problems of retroactivity would have been
presented. Because it failed to do so (or because the petitioners' certiorari petitions were inartfully
drafted), the Court should admit its mistake and order new sentencing hearings for these petitioners.
165. See supra note 134.
166. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 351 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Statistics...
show that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is no greater in those communities where execu-
tions take place than in other communities. In fact, there is some evidence that imposition of capital
punishment may actually encourage crime, rather than deter it.") (footnotes omitted).
167. See, eg., Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239, 3239
(1989) (report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (the "Powell Commission")) ("[O]ur present system of multi-
layered state and federal appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and repetitious litigation,
and years of delay between sentencing and a judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was
permissible under the law.").
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addressed and resolved by the Court in its most recent Term. In McCles-
key v. Zant,168 the Court interpreted the abuse of the writ provision' 69 as
follows:
When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application, the govern-
ment bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ. The government
satisfies this burden if, with clarity and particularity, it notes peti-
tioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first
time, and alleges that petitioner has abused the writ. The burden to
disprove abuse then becomes petitioner's. To excuse his failure to raise
the claim earlier, he must show cause for failing to raise it and preju-
dice therefrom as those concepts have been defined in our procedural
default decisions .... If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to
raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he
or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result
from a failure to entertain the claim. 170
Recognizing this holding's potential impact on retroactivity doctrine, the
Court continued: "Application of the cause and prejudice standard in
the abuse of the writ context does not mitigate the force of Teague v.
Lane, [489 U.S. 288 (1989),] which prohibits, with certain exceptions,
the retroactive application of new law to claims raised in federal
habeas."171
Yet the new abuse of the writ standard dramatically mitigates the
force of the rationale for the Teague doctrine. Now that more petitions
may be disposed of at the district court level on abuse grounds, the
Court's concerns over an avalanche of successive habeas petitions have
been resolved. However, petitioners like Butler, Parks, and Sawyer will
(and should) still be heard, because the imposition of death based upon a
faulty sentencing procedure would easily satisfy the above "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" standard. Although McCleskey drastically
reduces the availability of habeas relief to the vast majority of inmates,
and may be criticized on that basis, it serves to wholly eliminate the basis
for the Teague doctrine in capital sentencing cases.
One unavoidable result of this approach would be the vacating of
numerous death sentences upon discovery of a new procedural require-
ment. Yet the burden upon the states of such resentencing would not be
as onerous as some claim. Only the sentence would be overturned, not
the conviction, and so all the evidence from the transcript of the previous
trial would be available at the resentencing. The state would simply re-
present its aggravating circumstances, and the defendant would proffer
any mitigating factors. The lapse of time would operate equally against
168. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1988).
170. McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1470.
171. Id. at 1470-71.
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both parties, as both prosecution and defense witnesses would tend to die
or disappear with equal frequency. And on a human scale, the pecuniary
cost of another sentencing hearing pales in comparison with the cost of
failing to provide one.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current Supreme Court doctrine concerning retroactivity evis-
cerates habeas corpus petitions, reducing them to mere formalities, espe-
cially for those sentenced to death and thus in need of the greatest
protections. Absent a blatant disregard of settled law by the state courts,
the federal courts will now decline to consider any novel arguments of-
fered by the defendant, on the grounds that the petitioner would not be
entitled to benefit from a favorable decision. This result is catastrophic
in the capital sentencing context. Under the Court's 1989-1990 deci-
sions, a death-row inmate may not assert a procedural error in his case if
that activity or omission was not recognized as erroneous before the peti-
tioner's case became final.
The remedy for this manifestly unjust result is to reformulate the
reach of the Teague doctrine's second exception. Because capital cases
qualitatively differ from non-capital cases, the reasoning of one is inappli-
cable to the other. In the capital punishment situation, the evolution of
the required procedural safeguards is not yet complete. Until it is, any
alteration in the procedures required during capital sentencing should be
deemed significant enough to trigger the second exception, thereby al-
lowing habeas petitioners to take advantage of the heightened require-
ments. Such a policy would not unduly disrupt state criminal systems,
and any concern over abuse of the process has already been eliminated by
the McCleskey case. Any other course of action is inconsistent with the
concept of a civilized society, one that would exact the ultimate punish-
ment only when the accused has been provided with all possible safe-
guards to prevent an unjust execution.
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